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pect more property rights against the United States than they actually
obtained and possess. This is because, despite the landowners' expectations and needs, water rights are subject to the same rules that govern all forms of property.
The court granted in part and denied in part the parties' crossmotions for partial summary judgment. On or before October 4, 2005,
the parties are to file a joint status report indicating how this case
should proceed.
Kathleen Potter
City of Gettysburg v. United States, 64 Fed. C1. 429 (Fed. C1. 2005)
(holding that damage to the City of Gettysburg's water delivery system
was not a taking due to the release language in the easement and permit granted by the U.S. Corps of Engineers in spite of the absence of
the city's signature on both documents).
In the 1960s, the City of Gettysburg, South Dakota ("City") contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") to construct a
system to transport water from the Oahe Reservoir to the city. In 1972,
the City requested a right-of-way easement from the Corps to build and
maintain portions of the water transport system on government property. In 1973, the Corps forwarded a proposed easement to the City.
That same year, the City received a Section 10 permit under the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, allowing the City to maintain
the water intake structure, lay an intake line, and construct a pumphouse on the Reservoir. After completing the project in 1975, the
City informed the Corps that it had not yet issued the requested easement. The Corps proceeded to send four different easement proposals
over the next three years, but it was not until March 7, 1978 that the
Corps formally granted and issued an easement to the City. The easement contained boilerplate release language to the effect that the
United States would not be liable for any damages to property or injuries to persons which arose from or were incidental to the use and occupation of the property ("hold harmless clause"). On that same date,
the Corps also issued a license as a corollary to the easement, giving
the City right-of-use of a nearby strip of land for a period of two years
as a temporary work site. The City did not sign the easement or the
license, and it contended that it therefore did not accept the terms of
either document, in particular the hold harmless clause. Beginning in
1995, periodic landslides on the Reservoir's slope caused damage to
the intake structure, pumphouse and underground transmission lines.
By 1997, the damage had become so severe that the City had to abandon the water supply system in its entirety.
In this dispute, the City contended that the damage to the water
supply system resulted from the Corps' construction, management and
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operation of the Reservoir and that the damage constituted a taking of
the City's property without just compensation in violation of the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Corps moved for summary judgment.
The U.S. Court of Federal Claims first addressed the jurisdictional
elements as to (1) whether the City had a property interest on which it
could base a takings claim and (2) whether the Corps' laches defense
barred the City's claim. Regarding the property interest, the Corps
argued that the permit did not convey any property right and the pipe
itself had no value without connection to the water source. The City
countered that at minimum it had a property interest in the portions
of the pipeline not located on government property and landslide
damage to those sections of pipeline alone rendered the rest useless.
The court found that the City did have a cognizable property interest
for the purposes of a takings claim. First, the permit merely limited
the transfer of an additional property interest. Second, the court
found that although the City did not have a property interest in the
permit itself, it did have a property interest in its damaged pipeline.
The court noted the importance of the fact that the City limited its
claim to the physical pipelines and did not argue a taking of water
rights or a right to maintain its structures in navigable waters. The
court also rejected the Corps' argument that the government's navigational servitude would preclude the City from presenting a cognizable
property interest. The Corps argued that the City could not have a
property interest requiring compensation because large portions of the
water system were located below the mean high-water mark for the
Reservoir. The court found the argument inapplicable to the facts at
hand because the City was not claiming a loss of access to water or
some interference based on the raising or lowering of water levels.
Regarding the second jurisdictional element, the court rejected the
Corps' laches claim because the Corps did not show that the City delayed unreasonably in asserting its cause of action.
The court then turned to the substantive issues of the takings
claim, beginning with whether the release language in the easement
and the permit barred the City's claim. The court found that the City
was estopped from asserting that it did not agree to the terms of the
easement and the permit. The government's silence as to its acceptance of the terms of the easement was misleading conduct. The Corps
also relied upon that conduct when it allowed the City to construct its
water supply system. Finally, there would be material prejudice if the
City were allowed to declare the easement unenforceable decades after
its issuance. Therefore, the court rejected the City's argument that it
was not bound to the terms of the easement and the permit due to the
absent signatures. Consequentially, the hold harmless clauses in the
easement and the permit applied to the City.
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The court next rejected the City's contractual argument that the
easement was an unenforceable contract of adhesion, noting that if the
easement had been unenforceable, the City would have been trespassing on government land. Finally, the court turned to the ultimate
analysis of whether the permit's release clause was applicable to the
landslide damage. The court found the language to be unambiguous
in application to all damage resulting to the intake structure, the pumphouse and the intake line. Therefore, the court denied the City's
takings claim with respect to all damage to those structures.
Michelle Young
Hansen v. United States, 65 Fed. C1. 76 (Fed. C1. 2005) (holding that a
direct and substantial contamination of ground water constituted a
Fifth Amendment takings claim).
James A. Hansen brought a Fifth Amendment takings claim in the
Court of Federal Claims against the Department of Agriculture Forest
Service ("Forest Service") for the contamination of groundwater under
the Guest Nemo Ranch ("Ranch"). In the 1970s, the Forest Service
used ethylene dibromide ("EBD") mixed with diesel fuel as a pesticide
against a beetle infestation in the Black Hills National Forest. In 1976,
the Forest Service disposed of its EBD surplus by burying large quantities of it in unsealed containers. The Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") published several studies in the 1970s concerning the
harmful effects of EBD such as increased risk of cancer, mutations, and
adverse reproductive effects. In 1983, the EPA banned the use of EBD
as an agricultural fumigant.
Hansen acquired the Ranch on October 29, 1998 from Dale
Deverman. Prior to Hansen's ownership, the Forest Service found
EBD in 10 of the 18 wells located in the town of Nemo through tests
done by a commercial testing company called Envirosearch International ("Envirosearch"). Envirosearch also found EBD in one of the
Ranch's wells. Both Hansen and Deverman were unaware of the well's
contamination at the time of the sale. In 2000, Hansen learned that
two of the Ranch's five wells were contaminated. Because three of the
wells were not contaminated and the Ranch was commercial in nature,
the Forest Service refused to supply the Ranch with clean water. Hansen subsequently sold the Ranch to Ron Wick via a contract for deed
which set forth that Wick would receive the deed to the Ranch upon
making the last payment. Furthermore, the contract required Hansen
to ensure the Ranch had clean water. If the Ranch became inoperable
due to contamination, the contract allowed Wick to withhold payments
and even receive interest on the payments he had already made.
Hansen filed a takings claim against the Forest Service, arguing the
Forest Service unconstitutionally took the Ranch by contaminating the
Ranch's groundwater. Hansen sought compensation for the entire

